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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
rather than excluded.0 Whether the authority of the House under
article 1, section 5 to expel a member "with the Concurrence of two-thirds"
constitutes an unreviewable textual commitment remains to be answered.
Yet surely a legislative body has the authority to police the conduct of
its own members. To hold otherwise is to conclude that it is at the
mercy of its unscrupulous or disruptive legislators.
The specific holding of Powell--that a duly elected legislator cannot
be excluded if he meets the constitutionally specified requirements-is of
little significance in the day-to-day practice of law. Its real importance
to the practitioner is in the partial collapse of the political-question doc-
trine as an aid to a policy of judicial self-restraint. It would seem that
Powell has provided authority for federal courts to hear important con-
stitutional issues previously held to be non-justiciable.
NEILL HOWARD FLEISHMAN
Criminal Procedure-Juries in the Juvenile Justice System?
In re Gault' indicated in dictum that a juvenile hearing must meet
the basic requirements of due process.2 Duncan v. Louisiane held that
trial by jury in non-petty criminal cases is a basic requirement of due
process. The logical completion of the syllogism is: A juvenile hear-
ing must involve a jury if the youth's offense is not petty or his term
0" 395 U.S. at 508. The Court also expressed no view on what, if any, limitation
may exist on Congress' expulsion powers. Id. at 507 n.27.
'387 U.S. 1 (1967).
'The Court in Gault said that in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966),
[w]e announced... that while "We do not mean ... to indicate that the
hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal
trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; . . . we do hold that the
hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treat-
ment." We reiterate that view, here in connection with a juvenile court
adjudication of "delinquency" ....
3,87 U.S. at 30 (footnote omitted). The Court in Gault was silent about trial
by jury: Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), had not yet been decided,
and the facts might not have presented the issue in any event since Gerald
Gault's offense if committed by an adult could not have brought a sentence of
longer than two months. Id. at 8-9. The specific holding of Gault went only
so far as to require notice of the charges, id. at 33-34; the right to be repre-
sented by counsel or by appointed counsel in cases of poverty, id. at 41; the
privilege to remain silent, id. at 55; and the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, id. at 56-57.
8391 U.S. 145 (1968). See also Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
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of institutionalization potentially extensive. On the basis of a techni-
cality, however, the United States Supreme Court declined the oppor-
tunity to apply this logic and dismissed the recent case of DeBacker v.
Brainard,4 which squarely presented the issue of the right to a jury in
juvenile hearings.
The state courts are split on the question, both internally and from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Since Gault was handed down, fewer courts
have followed the logic outlined above than not.5 The most recent of
majority persuasion is the North Carolina Supreme Court, which in
deciding In re Burrus' noted that the juvenile (district) court had met all
the narrow Gault requirements,7 that trial by jury was not among them,
and that, therefore, the case was closed.'
The decisions and opinions against the jury requirement in juvenile
proceedings elaborate in detail the theory that gave rise to a separate
system of justice for juveniles at the turn of the century; they point to
the excellence of the goals of the theory; they emphasize the crucial differ-
ences between that theory and the criminal justice system for adults.
At times admitting a certain gap between theory and actuality,9 these
'396 U.S. 28 (1969). In DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968), the
Court held that Duncan and Bloom would have only prospective application.
Clarence DeBacker's juvenile court hearing was held on March 28, 1968; Duncan
and Bloom were handed down on May 20, 1968.
5 Three pre-Duwcan cases interpreted Gault to require trial by jury in thejuvenile hearing: Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716 (1968) ; In re Rindell, 2 BNA CRIm.
L. REP. 3121 (Providence, R.I., Fam. Ct. 1968). See also Hogan v. Rosenberg,
24 N.Y.2d 207, 247 N.E.2d 260, 299 N.Y.S.2d 424, prob. jutris. noted sub zorn.
Baldwin v. New York, 395 U.S. 932, motion to expedite denied sub nom. Puryear
v. Hogan, 395 U.S. 973 (1969). Among the decisions denying trial by jury
before Duncan are: Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. Super. 62, 234 A.2d 9(1967) and Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wash. 2d 272, 438 P.2d 205 (1968); after Duncan:
Dryden v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1968); In re Johnson, 255 Md.
1, 255 A.2d 419 (1969); DeBacker v. Brainard, 183 Neb. 461, 161 N.W.2d 508(1968), aff'd per curiam, 396 U.S. 28 (1969); In re State ex rel. J. W., 106
N.J. Super. 129, 254 A.2d 334 (Union County Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1969); and
In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969). The rift is most clearly dem-
onstrated with the DeBacker case. Four of the seven judges on the Nebraska
Supreme Court found the confluence of Gault and Duncan a mandate to
reverse that state's policy of excluding the jury from the juvenile hearing. How-
ever, the Nebraska Constitution provides that "[11o legislative act shall be held
unconstitutional except by the concurrence of five judges." NEB. CONsT. art. 5,§ 2.
275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969).
'These requirements are listed in note 2 supra.
8 275 N.C. at 533-34, 169 S.E.2d at 889.
' ln re Johnson, 255 Md. 1, -, 255 A.2d 419, 423 (1969); In re W., 24
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opinions nonetheless indicate a belief that interjecting the jury would
mean a retrogression to the "ordinary criminal trial."'" The theory
favored can be expressed in this fashion: The wayward child is not
to be examined with regard to the act he might have committed; but
rather the judge, as the child's surrogate parent, is benignly to inquire
into the totality of circumstances impinging on the child and do the best
for him; official stigma is to be washed away. Strict procedures would
be antithetical to such a non-retributive process. The process, in fact,
would be wholly civil, simply an extension of the equity court's traditional
jurisdiction over neglected children. Not so exuberantly stated, the theory
was nonetheless thriving handsomely in 1969: "The delinquency status
is not made a crime; and the proceedings are not criminal. There is,
hence, no deprivation of due process . . ." in disallowing jury trial."
The argument is that aside from weighing down the juvenile proceed-
ing with a criminal-trial aura, the presence of the jury would cramp the
judge's flexibility in the essential "whole-child" analysis. Contentiousness
would be promoted. The cherished informality that engenders a sense
of cooperation and does not overly frighten the child would be destroyed.
Implicit in this argument is the notion that the traditional secrecy of the
N.Y.2d 196, 198, 247 N.E.2d 253, 254, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414, 416, prob. juris. noted
sub norn. In re Winship, 396 U.S. 885 (1969) ; Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa.
Super. 62, 70-71, 234 A.2d 9, 13-14 (1967). On March 31, 1970, the United States
Supreme Court, deciding In re Whiship, reversed the New York court and held that
the Constitution requires as high a standard of proof in juvenile courts as in courts
trying adults. N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1970, at 24, col. 1.
10 387 U.S. at 75 (dissenting opinion). The phrase is Justice Harlan's, used in
the specific context of Gault, but typical of the "theorist" approach.
" In re W., 24 N.Y.2d 196, 203, 247 N.E.2d 253, 257, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414, 420
(1969). The theorists are not at all chary of quoting the old cases. The successful
dissent to the majority's decision in DeBacker at the state level, for example,
quoted Laurie v. State, 108 Neb. 239, 242-43, 188 N.W. 110, 111 (1922), quoting
Wisconsin Indus. School for Girls v. Clark County, 103 Wis. 651, 664-65, 79
N.W. 422, 426-27 (1899):
"'The proceeding is not one according to the course of the common law
in which the right of trial by jury is guaranteed, but a mere statutory
proceeding for the accomplishment of the protection of the helpless, which
object was accomplished before the Constitution without the enjoyment of
a jury trial. There is no restraint upon the natural liberty of children
contemplated by such a law-none whatever; but rather the placing of
them under the natural restraint, so far as practicable, that should be, but
is not, exercised by parental authority. It is the mere conferring upon them
that protection to which, under the circumstances, they are entitled as a
matter of right."'
183 Neb. at 472-73, 161 N.W.2d at 514. For an explanation of why the dissent
was successful under Nebraska law, see note 5 supra.
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juvenile proceeding would be compromised by the presence of a jury,
thus increasing the stigma felt by the child. Presumably, the argument
goes, the jury is an inadequate fact-finder-at least, no better a fact-
finder than the judge. And the question is put: Could there be any petty-
serious distinction made as called for by the rationale of Duncan?
Juveniles may normally be committed to a training school for an in-
definite period, not to exceed their minority, even though the given
offense if committed by an adult might involve a maximum sentence of
less than six months. Finally, it is argued that the jury's inefficiency
would promote delay at great economic cost and also at great cost in
terms of crippling the more immediate implementation of the theory.
It takes no imagination to prophesy that the increase in percentage
of jury trials could easily delay a case for several years, which in the
case of growing children whose personalities and learning change
daily, is much more critical than in the case of adults.12
This note will attempt to show that each of these arguments against
the jury fails; it will not attempt affirmatively to argue on behalf of the
jury as an institution. Trial by jury is not "the mainstay and bulwark
upon which truth and liberty rest"'" nor "the most cherished right
awarded to man."' 4 But Duncan v. Louisianu stands as a constitutional
mandate, however strong or weak its logical underpinnings. If the juvenile
proceeding is not meaningfully different from the adult proceeding in its
form or consequences, Gault and Duncan demand that trial by jury be
granted when requested.
The fundamental analytical blunder of the contra-jury theorists has
been the failure in their reasoning to separate the adjudicatory from the
dispositional aspects of the juvenile proceeding; as will be shown later,
the need for flexibility exists primarily on the dispositional side where
the jury has no place. Another error, or perhaps a knowing technique
for avoiding confrontation of the real issues, has been the intoning of
catch-phrases such as "parens patriae" or "civil, not criminal." "Form
[has] swallowed substance, and semantics [has] disposed of the consti-
tutional rights of juveniles . . . ."' The Supreme Court indicated in
Gault that it is not tricked by these words:
1 Brief for Appellee at 12, DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28 (1969).
"In re Rindell, 2 BNA C1imI. L. REI. 3121 (Providence, R.I., Fain. Ct. 1968).1
,Id. at 3126.
DeBacker v. Brainard, 183 Neb. 461, 466, 161 N.W.2d 508, 511 (1968).
1970]
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The Latin phrase [parens patriae] proved to be a great help to those
who sought to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the consti-
tutional scheme; but its meaning is murky and its historic credentials
are of dubious relevance. 16
Before other grounds for excluding the jury from the juvenile hear-
ing are examined, a basic point-which will appear too obvious-must
be made. One gets the impression from the cases that there is a fear
that the unknowing juvenile will be forced into having a jury and thus
will be unduly intimidated. "[T]he short answer is that if an accused
juvenile and his counsel do not want a jury trial, they do not have to
have one.' 17
The plea for informality fails to take into account the salutary effect
that the solemnity of the courtroom has in increasing respect for the
law." Furthermore, the idea of informality in the courtroom or even
the judge's chambers (where the judge "can on occasion put his arm
around [the child's] shoulder and draw the lad to him")" is a hoax.
The process may be less formal from the judge's point of view, but it
is not the judge's "alienation" about which there is concern. The process
cannot be informalized from a child's point of view.2 0
A noble aim of the juvenile court theory has been "to save [the
child] from the brand of criminality, the brand that sticks to it for
life .... ,,1' Yet how much violation of secrecy is really going to occur
10 387 U.S. at 16.
Dorsen & Rezneck, In Re Gault and the Future of Iuvenile Law, 1 FAM.
L.Q. 1, 23-24 (Dec. 1967) [hereinafter cited as Dorsen & Rezneck]. N.C. CONST.
art. 1, § 13, guaranteeing trial by jury in criminal cases, has been interpreted to
require trial by jury for all adults accused of any crimes except petty mis-
demeanors. State v. Holt, 90 N.C. 749 (1884). If a youthful offender is to be
treated in the same way as an adult in regard to the right to trial by jury, as this
note indicates Gault and Duncan require, then it may be argued that a North
Carolina juvenile, in the same way as a North Carolina adult, will not be allowed
to waive the jury. This argument has the advantage of consistency, but it also
ensures that the judge can never play the role attributed to him by the theorists
even when all parties are willing for him to attempt it.18Dorsen & Rezneck 23.
19 Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 H. v. L. REv. 104, 120 (1909) [hereinafter
cited as Mack].
"0 [I]nformal handling appears informal only to the officials charged with
execution of certain responsibilities; to those caught up in the net of thejuvenile justice system, it is impressively authoritative and formal ....
THE PRESIDENT'S CoMMIssIoN ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 10(1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REP.]. The Commission recognized
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by including twelve strangers in the juvenile adjudicatory process? Al-
ready exclusion of the general public from a juvenile hearing is dis-
cretionary with the judge, at least in North Carolina. 2 Moreover, the
Court in Gault called the claim of secrecy, with regard to the perhaps more
telling area of court records, "more rhetoric than reality."'
The possibility that some petty offenses might be tried by jury in
juvenile court along with offenses serious by adult standards is certainly
an unsubstantial reason for denying the right to jury. The maximum
possible adult sentence could furnish one test for determining whether
the given offense was serious or petty.2' However, a juvenile offender
when committed to a reformatory remains incarcerated at the discretion of
the institution's administrators for a period that typically may not extend
beyond the youth's eighteenth or twenty-first birthday. Gerald Gault,
for example, could have been institutionalized for as many as six years
since he was only fifteen years old at the time of his hearing; however,
had he been an adult, he could not have received a sentence of more than
two months. 5 In this sense, no offense committed by a youth is ever
"petty."
To the fact-finding and economic arguments against the jury, the
answer is that these may also be directed against the adult trial system;
thus they were refuted in Duncan. In that decision the Court relied on
a "recent and exhaustive study" by Messrs. Kalven and Zeisel,26 which
"concluded that juries do understand the evidence and come to sound
conclusions in most of the cases presented to them. .. "'I, The efficiency-
economy argument seems particularly inappropriate in a state such as
North Carolina, which has one of the highest annual (adult) criminal
jury trial rates in the nation.2
22 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-285 (1969).
28387 U.S. at 24. This observation is one further example of the disparity
between theory and reality.
In theory the court's action was to affix no stigmatizing label. In fact a
delinquent is generally viewed by employers, schools, the armed services--
by society generally-as a criminal.
TASK Fo CE REP. 9.
" The maximum adult sentence was accepted as the test by the losing, though
majority, faction of the Nebraska Supreme Court in DeBacker v. Brainard, 183
Neb. 461, 469-70, 161 N.W.2d 508, 513 (1968).25 387 U.S. at 8-9.
I2 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AmERICAN JuRy 494 (1966).
27391 U.S. at 157.
2 In the year 1955 there were 3,950 criminal jury trials in North Carolina; this
number was exceeded only in Georgia (5,300), California (4,940), and Alabama
(4,270). If. KAvEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AmEmCAN JuRY 502-03 (1966).
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It is perhaps true that delay is a more serious matter with regard to
juveniles than to adults, especially in light of the frightening upsurge of
juvenile delinquency in the last decade 9 and the general belief that more
"can be done with" a child than an adult if only he can be "got to" soon
enough; but delay is endemic throughout the judicial system and is a
serious blackmark against it no matter what the defendant's age. Against
the economy argument must be balanced the constitutional right that
is involved. 0 Moreover, gross delay may in the end be a good thing:
perhaps the people and the legislatures will be forced to give more attention
to these problems.
The theorists' intricate rationale against jury-inclusion in juvenile
proceedings rests upon a tenuous foundation consisting of certain in-
correct assumptions: that a juvenile court judge always uses his un-
hampered discretion in the most intelligent and benevolent way; that
the dispositional alternatives open to a judge are genuinely rehabilitative;
and that instituting the jury must necessarily deprive the judge of any
flexibility with which he might sensitively employ rehabilitative plans, if
available. These assumptions will be considered in turn.
One state court judge recoiled angrily against the statement in Gault
that "the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court"81;
he called this "an implied criticism of juvenile judges that is wholly un-
warranted."82 Other judges are not so defensive, but they exhibit a no
less unqualified faith in the juvenile court judge. 8 However, the image
of the amiable, well-meaning, tender-hearted, fatherly juvenile court
judge is no more realistic than the conception of the judge as overworked,
hardened, insensitive, and prosecution-oriented. The mere possibility of
the latter is sufficient ground for requiring determination of guilt by a
jury. This ancient reason for having trial by jury is no less compelling
because the defendant is under the age of sixteen. To the contrary, it
" TASK FoRcE REP. 1.
o See In re Rindell, 2 BNA CEIm. L. REP. 3121, 3125 (Providence, R.I., Faro.
Ct. 1968).
387 U.S. at 28.
"DeBacker v. Brainard, 183 Neb. 461, 476, 161 N.W.2d 508, 516 (1968)
(dissenting opinion). The judge declared, "I am not so naive as not to recognize
that Kent, Gault, and Duncan point to the eventual destruction of the juvenile
court acts existing in most of the states of the union." Id. at 480-81, 161 N.W.2d
at 518. "But I shall neither bend the knee nor bow the head on mere inferences,
speculations, or probabilities as to what [the United States Supreme Court]
will eventually do." Id. at 482, 161 N.W.2d at 519.8 See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. Super. 62, 76-77, 234 A.2d 9, 16-17
(1967). .
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has been said that "juvenile judges have the most difficult job in the
whole legal system"-a job demanding intelligence and empathy; yet it
is a job generally without prestige.34 Moreover, "[a]s often as not the
judge acts as prosecutor-a depressingly unjust practice. Or he assigns
the job to a probation worker who later is supposed to win the child'
confidence to help him change his ways." 5 If a juvenile court has
pre-judicial machinery for screening out numerous youthful offenders,
those sent into court cannot but be "tainted" in the judge's eyes; a jury
would not be as likely to feel such a prejudice.
If the juvenile justice system worked, the argument for exclusion
of the jury from the hearing and, indeed, for deprivation of procedural
due process generally, would seem much stronger-even though the argu-
ment is not stronger from a purely logical point of view. The inference
from the court opinions opposing inclusion of the jury, even when they
acknowledge a degree of failure in the system, is that it is successful
to a greater or lesser degree. But the truth is startlingly the opposite. 6
In 1909 Judge Mack described juvenile penal-corrective conditions
prior to the inception of the theory of the juvenile justice system as
follows:
[I]nstead of the state's training its bad boys so as to make of them
decent citizens, it permitted them to become the outlaws and outcasts
"James, Do Children Get Their Day in Court?, The Christian Science
Monitor, April 12-14, 1969, at 10, col. 4.
" Id., col. 1.
O No discussion of juvenile delinquency would be complete without the much-
quoted statement from the Supreme Court's first juvenile delinquency case, Kent v.
United States:
[T]here may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of
both worlds: that he gets neither the protections afforded to adults nor the
solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.
383 U.S. at 556 (footnote omitted). The Task Force Report of the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of justice leaves no doubt
about the failure of the system:
[T]he postulates of specialized treatment and resulting reclamation basic
to the juvenile court have significantly failed of proof, both in implementa-
tion and in consequences. The dispositions available for most youths adjudi-
cated delinquent are indistinguishable from those for adult criminals: Pro-
bation with a minimum of contact... or institutionalization in what is often,
as a result of overcrowding and understaffing, a maximum security ware-
house for youths. The vaunted intermediate and auxiliary measures--com-
munity residential centers, diversified institutions and institutional pro-
grams, intensive supervision-with which youth was to be reclaimed have
come to pass only sporadically, hampered by lack of money, lack of staff,
lack of support, lack of evaluation.
TAsK FORCE REP. 23.
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of society; it criminalized them by the very methods that it used in
dealing with them.3 7
His statement perfectly describes conditions today, long after implementa-
tion of the theory. Probational officers or juvenile counselors, where they
exist, have "caseloads typically .. .so high that counseling and super-
vision take the form of occasional phone calls and perfunctory visits
instead of the careful, individualized service that was intended" 8 ; salaries
being meagre, naturally the most intelligent and dynamic persons are not
drawn into the field. State institutions for juvenile delinquents are regi-
mented and often brutal 9 festering grounds for hardening youths un-
alterably into criminals.4"
Mack 107. Judge Mack's conception of the ease with which juveniles could
be rehabilitated was perhaps grossly overly optimistic. Yet he realized that
despite the great ultimate financial saving to the state through this method
of dealing with children, a saving represented by the value of a decent
citizen as against a criminal, the public authorities are nowhere fully alive
to the new obligations that the spirit as well as the letter of this legislation
imposes upon them.
Id. 115. He was aware that the system could not work without meaningful re-
habilitative alternatives, and he warned:
If a child must be taken away from its home, if for the natural parental
care that of the state is to be substituted, a real school, not a prison in
disguise, must be provided.
Id. 114.
" TASK FORcE REP. 8.
"
9 See James, Do Children Get Their Day in Court?, The Christian Science
Monitor, April 12-14, at 9, col. 1.
"' According to Mr. George F. McGrath, head of the New York City prison
system:
The public should be told that correctional agencies contribute enorm-
ously to the crime rate . . . . There is a direct relationship between the
growing crime rate and our institutions.
The people do not understand that. Public officials do not understand
that. But it is unquestionably true.
James, Reach a Child Early Enough, The Christian Science Monitor, April 19-21,
at 9, col. 3. Mr. Milton Luger, president of the National Association of State
Juvenile Delinquency Program Administrators, has said: "[W]ith the exception
of a relatively few youths, it [would be] better for all concerned if young de-
linquents were not detected, apprehended, or institutionalized. Too many of them
get worse in our care." James, "Too Many of Them Get Worse it Our Care,"
The Christian Science Monitor, April 26-28, at 9, col. 4.
. . . Oliver J. Keller, who recently took over as head of the Florida
Division of Youth Services [has said]:
"We are working in a terribly primitive field. Primitive. Punitive.
Brutal. I don't like large institutions. I don't like what happens to children
in them. One of my men says living in a training school is as cozy as living
in a wash bay of a filling station. I agree. The child is returned to the
streets with none of his family problems solved. And he's more sophisti-
cated in crime."
[Vol. 48
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Despite the imperfections of the present system of juvenile justice,
without any doubt "the ideal of separate treatment of children is still
worth pursuing."' 41 Just as obviously, the traditional jury is not equipped
to know the best dispositional alternatives for each individual child,
no matter how effectively the opposing counsel argue for given disposi-
tions. The fallacy in mourning the demise of the juvenile justice system
because of the intrusion of the jury is in the failure to distinguish the
adjudicatory, or "fact," and dispositional, or "whole-child," aspects of a
proceeding.42 A jury centers only upon the question of whether a specific
act was committed. The Supreme Court was careful to make this dis-
tinction in Gault:
[W] e are not here concerned with the procedures or constitutional
rights applicable to the pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process, nor
do we direct our attention to the post-adjudicative or dispositional
process. . . . We consider only . . . proceedings by which a deter-
mination is made as to whether a juvenile is a "delinquent" as a result
of alleged misconduct on his part, with the consequence that he may be
committed to'a state institution.4 3
As the Court explained:
We do not mean by this to denigrate the juvenile court process or
to suggest that there are not aspects of the juvenile system relating
to offenders which are valuable. But the features of the juvenile
system which its proponents have asserted are of unique benefit will not
be impaired by constitutional domestication.44
One more among the catalogue of reasons given for excluding the
jury is that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court extends beyond juveniles
who have committed adult crimes and includes suzerainty over juveniles
who have violated laws peculiar to children (e.g., truancy), who are
dependent (because their parents are economically unable to take care of
41 TASK FoRcE REF. 9.
"Technically, both fact and whole-child analyses are adjudicatory, the dis-
positional being yet another step. However, the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of justice has used the adjudication-disposition
terminology.
Perhaps the height of the juvenile court's procedural informality is its
failure to differentiate clearly between the adjudication hearing, whose
purpose is to determine the truth of the allegations in the petition, and the
disposition proceeding, at which the juvenile's background is considered in
connection with deciding what to do with him.
Id. 35.
"387 U.S. at 13.
"Id. at 22.
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them), or who are neglected (since their parents wilfully refuse to take
care of them)." Partly because of this argument, the President's Com-
mission's Task Force Report, written before Gault and Duncan were
handed down, opposed the jury:
Inequality and disparate decisions are invited by giving these formu-
lae [neglect, dependency, incorrigibility, truancy, etc.] to ad hoc juries
for application rather than to judges, who tend inevitably to develop
concrete meanings for such terms.48
The simple answer to this objection is that since juries do not decide
such matters in adult trials, they need not decide them in juvenile hear-
ings. The marriage of Gault and Duncan would not require it.
So far as adjudication of guilt is concerned, there are no additional
adjudicatory problems presented merely because the defendant is a child.
The issues in the delinquency trial of a law violation are the same
as in a criminal trial of the same offense. The jury function of weighing
the evidence, evaluating the credibility of witnesses, and finding the
facts are [sic] no harder with respect to whether a juvenile com-
mitted a criminal act than whether an adult did.4 7
It will still be argued, however, that since juvenile proceedings are
wholly rehabilitative in spirit, the adjudication of the fact of guilt vel non
is unimportant and irrelevant. The New York Court of Appeals said on
March 6, 1969: "[A] child's best interest is not necessarily, or even
probably, promoted if he wins in the particular inquiry which may bring
him to the juvenile court."4 Of course, the major goal of the juvenile
court movement was to get away from the mere "specific act" determina-
tion of the traditional criminal trial. But this last-ditch argument pays
no heed to the quotidian realities of judicial technique. A child whom
the juvenile court judge finds to be wholly innocent of any type of offense
is not likely to be retained and sent through the remaining channels of
the juvenile penal-corrective process simply because he has once come to
'"The new North Carolina statute typifies the generally loose formulations.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-278 (1969).
"' TAsK FORCE REP. 38. The Commission also opposed the jury on the basis
of formality. It must be noted that the Commission was gravely skeptical over
the possibility of youths being sent to training schools for acts that are not
offenses when committed by adults. Id. 25-28.
' 
T Dorsen & Rezneck 23.
"i% re W., 24 N.Y.2d 196, 199, 247 N.E.2d 253, 255, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414,
417 (1969).
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the judge's attention. The jury assailants are put in the position of argu-
ing that a judge presented with four children-one innocent of any act,
though peevish or melancholy; one guilty only of having parents who
do not want him; one who has stolen a piece of candy; and one who has
murdered the town's most distinguished citizen-will look only to each
child's emotional and developmental needs in fashioning a plan for his
behavior modification.
On the one hand, it cannot be denied that the act a child has com-
mitted is inseparable from the child's personality; his act has become
a part of his personality in the eyes of all who view the child.
However advanced our techniques for determining what an indi-
vidual is, we have not approached the point at which we can safely
ignore what he has done. What he has done may often be the most
revealing evidence of what he is 49
On the other hand, neither can it be denied that the judge is the em-
bodiment of society, and as such he must and will-even -if not con-
sciously-protect society from threatening conduct, no matter if that
conduct is committed by a fourteen-year-old or by a twenty-four-year-old.
While statutes, judges, and commentators still talk the language of
compassion, help, and treatment, it has become clear that in fact the
same purposes that characterize the use of the criminal law for adult
offenders-retribution, condemnation, deterrence, incapacitation-are
involved in the disposition of juvenile offenders, too.5"
Simply put, there is a punitive as well as a rehabilitative element in the
juvenile process; to this extent the adjudication of the fact of guilt is
important, and the jury has a place in the juvenile hearing.
HAYWo0D RANKIN
10TAsi FORCE REP. 30, quoting ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL
JusTIcE 19 (1964).
11 TASK FORCE RI'. 8. The Commission accounted for nonrecognition of the
punitive aspect of the juvenile process in the following way:
One explanation of the general failure to admit the court's social pro-
tection function is, of course, the traditional view that the juvenile court
must and does act always and only in the child's best interest, regardless of
any interest society may have. A second and, perhaps, more significant
reason lies in the fact that most juvenile courts are legislatively provided
with mechanisms [e.g., waiver to adult court] for evading the social pro-
tection responsibility in its ... most public posture.
Id. 24.
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